Robust Distributed Averaging: When are Potential-Theoretic Strategies
  Optimal? by Khanafer, Ali & Başar, Tamer
1Robust Distributed Averaging: When are
Potential-Theoretic Strategies Optimal?
Ali Khanafer and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract
We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network.
The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strate-
gically disconnects a set of links to prevent the nodes from reaching consensus. Meanwhile, the network
designer assists the nodes in reaching consensus by changing the weights of a limited number of links
in the network. We formulate two Stackelberg games to describe this competition where the order in
which the players act is reversed in the two problems. Although the canonical equations provided by
the Pontryagin’s maximum principle seem to be intractable, we provide an alternative characterization
for the optimal strategies that makes connection to potential theory. Finally, we provide a sufficient
condition for the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium for the underlying zero-sum game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various physical and biological phenomena where global patterns of behavior stem from local
interactions have been modeled using linear distributed averaging dynamics. In such dynamics
an agent updates its value as a linear combination of the values of its neighbors. Averaging
dynamics is the basic building block in many multi-agent systems, and it is widely used when-
ever an application requires multiple agents, who are graphically constrained, to synchronize
their measurements. Examples include formation control, coverage, distributed estimation and
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2optimization, and flocking [2]–[4]. Besides engineering, linear distributed averaging finds ap-
plications in other fields as well. For instance, social scientists use averaging to describe the
evolution of opinions in networks [5].
In practice, communication among agents is prone to different types of non-idealities which can
affect the convergence properties of the associated distributed algorithms. Transmission delays
[6], noisy links [7], [8], and quantization [9] are some examples of non-idealities that are due to
the physical nature of the application. In addition to physical restrictions, researchers have also
studied averaging dynamics in the presence of malicious nodes in the network [10], [11].
In [12], we explored the effect of an external adversary who attempts to prevent the nodes
from reaching consensus by launching network-wide attacks. When the adversary is capable
of disconnecting certain links in the network, we derived the optimal strategy of the adversary
and demonstrated that it admits a potential-theoretic analogy. In this paper, we also introduce
a network designer that attempts to counter the effect of the adversary and help the nodes
reach consensus. The designer is capable of changing the weights of certain links. Both the
adversary and the designer are constrained by their physical capabilities, e.g., battery life and
communication range. To capture such constraints, we allow the adversary and the designer to
affect only a fixed number of links at any point in time. The conflicting objectives of the designer
and the adversary calls for a game-theoretic formulation to study their interaction.
Such a competition between a network designer and an adversary can occur in various practical
applications. For example, in a wireless network, the link weights in such a network represent
the capacities of the corresponding links. The designer can modify the capacity of a certain
link using various communication techniques such as introducing parallel channels between two
nodes as in orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) networks [13]. In OFDMA
networks, the number of parallel links between two nodes is usually limited [14]. To capture
this limitation, we limit the amount by which the designer can increase the capacity of a given
link. The adversary can be a jammer who is capable of breaking links by injecting high noise
signals that disrupt the communication among nodes. The adversary is assumed to have sufficient
transmit power to disrupt the communication over any link, no matter what the number of parallel
channels is.
Our model in this paper is different from the models in the current literature in two ways:
(i) the adversary and the designer compete over a dynamical network. This is different from
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3the problems studied in the computer science and economics communities where the network
is usually static [15]; (ii) the players in our model are constrained and do not have an infinite
budget. This enables us to model practical scenarios more closely rather than allowing the
malicious behavior to be unrestricted as in [10], [16], [17], where it is assumed that the network
contains nodes that are misbehaving. In addition, those papers focus on finding necessary and
sufficient conditions for the network to reach consensus in the presence of malicious nodes,
and observability theory is the main tool used to study such problems. Here, we assume that
all the nodes are normal, and we focus on identifying the links that are of importance to the
adversary and the designer who have conflicting objectives. This requires us to borrow tools
from differential games and optimal control theory.
The main goal of this work is to derive optimal strategies for the designer and the adversary.
By modeling the adversary as a strategic player and deriving optimal defense strategies, we
guarantee robustness against worst-case attacks, unlike existing approaches in which attacks on
links were modeled as random failures [18]. Because the order in which the players act affects
the resulting utilities, we formulate two Stackelberg games based on the order of play, allowing a
different player to have the first-move-advantage. When the adversary is allowed to play first, he
is capable of restricting the available actions of the designer since some links will disappear from
the network. Hence, if we were to cast the problem as a zero-sum game between the players,
we should not expect the existence of a saddle-point equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategies. The
question we would like to answer is then: are there scenarios where the order of play does not
affect the eventually attained utilities of the players, which leads to the existence of an SPE?
Accordingly, the contributions of this paper are as follows. We capture the interaction between
the designer and the adversary by formulating two separate problems. In the min–max problem,
the designer declares a strategy first to which the adversary reacts by its optimal response. The
second problem is a max–min one where the order of play is reversed. Assuming the controllers
do not switch infinitely many times over a finite interval among the available actions, we derive
the optimal strategies for both problems in terms of potential-theoretic quantities by working
directly with the utility functional. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the derived strategies satisfy
the necessary conditions provided by the maximum principle (MP). Finally, we derive a sufficient
condition guaranteeing the existence of an SPE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe the min–max and
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4max–min problems. In Section III, we derive the Stackelberg strategies and show that they satisfy
the MP. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of an SPE in Section IV. We end
the paper with concluding remarks and delineation of future research directions of Section V.
An Appendix includes a proof of one of the theorems and two technical results.
Notation and Terminology
We will use
∑
j>i(.) to mean
∑n
j=2
∑j−1
i=1 (.), [.]
T to denote the transpose of a vector or a
matrix [.], and 1 to denote the n-dimensional column vector of 1’s. The Euclidean norm of a
vector is denoted by ‖.‖2 and the `1-norm of a vector is denoted by ‖.‖1. The absolute value
of a scalar variable is denoted by |.|, which we also use to denote the cardinality of a set—the
intended use of this operator will be clear from the context. The (i, j)-th element of a matrix X
is denoted by Xij . We will often use x to refer to a function or its value at a given time instant;
the context should make the distinction clear. We will use the words “strategy" and “action"
interchangeably; since we are seeking optimal open-loop strategies in this paper, both terms are
equivalent. A graph is a pair G = (N , E), where N is the set of nodes, and E ⊆ N × N is
the set of edges. An edge from node i ∈ N to node j ∈ N is denoted by eij , i.e., eij := (i, j).
A graph is called undirected if eij ∈ E if and only if eji ∈ E . A path is a collection of nodes
{i1, . . . , il} ⊆ N , l ∈ Z>1, such that eikik+1 ∈ E for all k ∈ {1, . . . , l−1}. We call an undirected
graph connected if it contains a path between any two nodes in N . Given an undirected graph
G = (N , E), we define the projection operator Φ : E ×R→ E such that Φ((e, r)) = e, for some
(e, r) ∈ E × R. When applied to a set S ⊂ E × R, the mapping Φ is defined as follows:
Φ(S) =

⋃
(e,r)∈S
Φ((e, r)), S 6= ∅
0, S = ∅
Given S ⊂ E × R, with |S| = k, let pi(S) = {(e1, r1), . . . , (ek, rk)}, where ri ∈ R and ei ∈ E
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, be an ordering of the elements of S such that r1 ≤ . . . ≤ rk. Then, given
` ∈ Z≥0, we define the set operator Φ` : E × R→ E as:
Φ`(S) =

Φ(S), ` > k
{e1, . . . , e`}, 0 < ` ≤ k
0, ` = 0 or k = 0
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5Throughout the paper, we will be dealing with undirected graphs. Although both eij, eji belong
to the set of edges E in such graphs, we do not distinguish between the two edges, and we treat
them as a single edge. As a result, in any set defined over E × R, we include a single tuple
(eij, rij), rij ∈ R, to represent both edges.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a connected network of n nodes and m links described by a weighted undirected
graph G = (N , E). The value, or state, of the nodes at time instant t ∈ R≥0 is given by
x(t) = [x1(t), ..., xn(t)]
T . The nodes start with an initial value x(0) = x0, and they are interested
in computing the average of their initial values, xavg = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi(0), via local averaging. We
consider the continuous-time averaging dynamics given by
x˙(t) = Ax(t), x(0) = x0, (1)
where the matrix A, Aij = aij ∈ R, has the following properties:
A = AT , A1 = 0,
Aij ≥ 0 , Aij = 0 ⇐⇒ eij /∈ E , i 6= j.
Define x¯ = 1xavg ∈ Rn and let M = 1n11T . A well-known result states that, under the above
assumptions, the nodes will reach consensus as t → ∞, i.e., limt→∞ x(t) = x¯ [2]. To achieve
their respective objectives, the designer and the adversary control the elements of A as we
describe next. This will render the matrix A to be time-varying.
The adversary attempts to slow down convergence by breaking at most ` ≤ m links at each
time t. Let uij(t) ∈ {0, 1} be the weight the adversary assigns to link eij ∈ E at time tR≥0. He
breaks link eij when uij(t) = 1. Define r :=
(
n
2
)
. The action set of the adversary is then
U = {w ∈ Rr : w = [w12, ..., w1n, w23, ..., w(n−1)n]T , wij ∈ {0, 1},
wij = 0 if eij /∈ E , ‖w‖1 ≤ `}.
The set of admissible controls, U , consists of all functions that are piecewise continuous in time
and whose range is U . Given a time interval [0, T ], we can formally write
U = {u : [0, T ]→ U | u is a piecewise continuous function of t} .
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6We introduce a network designer who attempts to accelerate convergence by controlling the
weights of the edges. The designer can change the weight of a given link by adding vij(t) to its
weight aij . We assume that vij(t) ∈ {0, b} and that the number of links the designer modifies is
at most ` ≤ m. Given the above definitions, we can write down the (i, j)-th element, i 6= j, of
the matrix A(u(t), v(t)) as
Aij(u(t), v(t)) = (aij + vij(t))(1− uij(t)), for all eij ∈ E (2)
We require that the resulting matrix is a negative Laplacian of the graph; hence, we must have
Aii(u(t), v(t)) = −
∑
j 6=iAij(u(t), v(t)), for all i ∈ V .
Given a time interval [0, T ], define the following functional:
J(u, v) =
1
2
∫ T
0
k(t)‖x(t)− x¯‖22dt,
where the weighting factor k(t) is positive and integrable over [0, T ], which can, for example, be
viewed as a discounting factor, such as k(t) = e−αt for some α > 0. This constitutes the utility
function of the adversary, and that of the designer is −J(u, v). We will study two problems.
In the first one, the adversary acts first by selecting the links he is interested in breaking.
Then, the network designer optimizes his choices over the resulting graph, which we denote by
G(u(t)) = (N , E(u(t))), where E(u(t)) = E \ {eij ∈ E : uij(t) = 1}. In this case, the action set
of the designer can be written as
V (u(t)) =
{
w ∈ Rr : w = [w12, ..., w1n, w23, ..., w(n−1)n]T , wij ∈ {0, b},
wij = 0 if eij /∈ E(u(t)), ‖w‖1 ≤ b`} .
The set of admissible controls for the designer, V(u), consists of all piecewise continuous
functions whose range is V (u). Formally, we define
V(u) = {v : [0, T ]→ V (u(t)) | v is a piecewise continuous function of t} .
The max–min problem can now be formally written as1
sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V(u)
J(u, v)
subject to x˙(t) = A(u(t), v(t))x(t), x(0) = x0.
1Even though existence of a maximum and a minimum has not yet been shown at this stage, we will still call this the
“max–min" problem in anticipation of such an existence result later in the paper. The formal definition below is still in terms
of sup and inf. The same argument applies to the min–max problem to be introduced shortly.
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7In the second problem, the order is reversed. Because the designer acts first in this problem,
he can optimize over the entire graph G. Thus, the action set of the designer in this problem is
V := V (0) and the set of its admissible controls is V := V(0); the sets of actions and admissible
controls of the adversary remain the same. We can then write
inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
J(u, v)
subject to x˙(t) = A(u(t), v(t))x(t), x(0) = x0.
In a computer network, the max–min problem allows the network designer (who is the
maximizer here) to architect networks that are robust against strategic virus diffusion. The min–
max problem finds applications in army combat situations where the designer (the minimizer)
attempts to counter the attacks of the enemy intending to disrupt the network communication.
Given the nature of the players’ possible modifications of the network, as described by (2), we
can view the actions of the players as switches among the possible Laplacian matrices resulting
from modifying the links. Moreover, the capability of the designer and the adversary to change
the system matrix renders it as a “switched" one. The optimal controllers for such systems can
exhibit Zeno effect, i.e., they may switch infinitely many times over a finite interval. In order to
explicitly eliminate the possibility of infinite switching, we make the following assumption in
the remainder of this paper.
Assumption 1. Let 0 ≤ r1 < . . . < rKu be the switching times of some u ∈ U and 0 ≤ s1 <
. . . < sKv be those of some v ∈ V . We assume that Ku, Kv ∈ Z≥0 are finite, and that there
exists a globally minimum dwell time τ > 0 such that
τ ≤ min {ri+1 − ri, si+1 − si, |ri − sj| : 1 ≤ i ≤ Ku, 1 ≤ j < Kv} , (3)
over which the system matrix A(u, v) is time-invariant.
Note that this assumption is well motivated for practical reasons. Consider, for example, a
communication network where an adversary is a jammer injecting an interfering signal at some
links. If the adversary chooses to change the set of links it is jamming, there must be some
delay for the adversary to change its configuration. Now, we make the following assumption for
both problems:
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8Assumption 2. The initial matrix A(0, 0), the time interval [0, T ], the values ` and b, and the
initial state x0 are common information to both players.
We recall the definition of an SPE.
Definition 1 (Saddle-Point Equilibrium (SPE) [19]). The pair (u?, v?) constitutes an SPE if it
satisfies the following pair of inequalities
J(u, v?) ≤ J(u?, v?) ≤ J(u?, v), (4)
for u ∈ U , v ∈ V .
The following remarks are now in order.
Remark 1. (Non-Rectangular Strategy Sets and Existence of SPE) When the strategy sets are
rectangular, i.e., the strategy of one player does not restrict the strategy space of the other, the
following relationship holds:
V = sup
u∈U
inf
v∈V
J(u, v) ≤ inf
v∈V
sup
u∈U
J(u, v) = V , (5)
where V , V are called, respectively, the lower and upper values of the game. When the strategy
sets are non-rectangular, however, the order in (5) may not hold. Moreover, one should not
expect the pair of inequalities (4) to hold, and hence an SPE may not exist. In the max–min
problem in this paper, the strategy sets of the players are non-rectangular as the adversary’s
action, removing links from G, could restrict the actions available to the designer.
Remark 2. (Problem Complexity) Let us consider the problem of the adversary for a given
strategy of the designer. Assume that the adversary can act at Ku ∈ Z≥0 given time instances
over the interval [0, T ]. Then, for ` ≤ m, assuming that ‖u(t)‖1 = ` for all t ∈ R≥0, the total
number of links that need to be tested in a brute-force approach is(
m
`
)Ku
≥
(m
`
)`Ku
. (6)
Clearly, the brute-force approach leads to an exponential number of computations as a function
of Ku. The same argument applies to the problem faced by the network designer.
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9III. OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
We will now present the solutions to the two problems introduced above. In [1], we have
shown that the canonical equations provided by the maximum principle (MP) are intractable due
to the interdependence between the state, costate, and the optimal controls; therefore, it may
not be possible to obtain the optimal strategies in closed form using the MP. Here, we take an
alternative route to arrive at the optimal strategies of the players by working directly with the
objective functional. In what follows, we will often drop the time index and other arguments
for notational simplicity. We will be using the term “connected component" to refer to a set of
connected nodes which have the same values. The following quantities will be central to the
derivation of the optimal strategies:
νij := −(xi − xj)2, wij := (aij + vij)νij. (7)
A. The Min–Max Problem
The following theorem presents the optimal strategy of the adversary in the min–max problem.
Define the set
L`(v) = Φ` ({(eij, (aij + vij)νij) : eij ∈ E}) ⊆ E . (8)
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, and for a fixed strategy v of the designer, the optimal
strategy of the adversary in the min–max problem is
u?ij(v) =
 1, eij ∈ L`(v)0, eij /∈ L`(v)
If the adversary has an optimal strategy of breaking fewer than ` links, then either G has a
cut of size less than ` or the nodes have reached consensus by time t. In either of these cases,
breaking ` links is also optimal.
Proof: For a fixed strategy of the designer v ∈ V , we will show that it is optimal for the
maximizer to rank the links based on their wij values, where wij was defined in (7). Under
Assumption 1, the function x becomes piecewise continuous. Hence, the function wij , for all
eij ∈ E , is also piecewise continuous and its value cannot change abruptly over a finite interval.
As a result, we can regard the system as a time-invariant one over a small interval [t0, t0 + δ] ⊂
[0, T ], where 0 < δ ≤ τ , and τ was defined in (3). The proof consists of two steps.
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1) Showing that, over a small interval [t0, t0 + δ], it is optimal for the adversary to switch
from a strategy u ∈ U to another strategy u? ∈ U , where u? entails breaking the ` links
with the lowest wij values.
2) Showing that allowing u? to mimic u for the remaining time of the problem preserves the
gain obtained over [t0, t0 + δ].
Over a small interval, u and u? induce certain system matrices. Let the system matrix corre-
sponding to u over [t0, t0 + δ] be A(u, v) = A, and let ‖u‖1 < ` over this interval. Because the
control strategies of both players are time-invariant over this interval, we have
x(t) = eA(t−t0)x(t0), t ∈ [t0, t0 + δ]. (9)
Let P (t) := eAt. Due to the structure of A, P (t) is a doubly stochastic matrix for t ≥ 0 [20, p.
63]. Note that we can write x(t0) = P˜ x0, where P˜ is some doubly stochastic matrix. Indeed,
assume that either or both controls had switched once at some time t˜0 ∈ [0, t0), and that the
system matrix over [0, t˜0) was A˜1, and the system matrix corresponding to [t˜0, t0) was A˜2. Then
x(t0) = e
A˜2(t0−t˜0)eA˜1 t˜0x0. Because both eA˜1t, eA˜2t are doubly stochastic matrices, their product
is also doubly stochastic. We can readily generalize this result to any number of switches in the
interval [0, t0). With this observation, we can write
x(t)− x¯ = P (t− t0)P˜ x0 −Mx0 = (P (t− t0)−M)x(t0),
where the last equality follows from the fact that
P˜M = MP˜ = M, P˜ is doubly stochastic. (10)
We want to show that switching from strategy u to strategy u? at some time t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ],
can improve the utility of the adversary. To this end, we assume that the matrix induced by u?
over [t0, t?) is A, while the system matrix corresponding to u? over [t?, t0 + δ] is B. Define the
doubly stochastic matrix Q(t) := eBt, t ≥ 0. Over [t?, t0 +δ], the strategies u and u? are identical
except at link eij ∈ E , where uij = 0 and u?ij = 1, i.e., ‖u‖1 < ‖u?‖1 over this sub-interval. It
follows that:
Aij > Bij = 0, Akl = Bkl ∀ekl 6= eij. (11)
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Formally, we want to prove the following inequality:∫ t0+δ
t0
k(t) ‖(P (t− t0)−M)x(t0)‖22dt
<
∫ t?
t0
k(t) ‖(P (t− t0)−M)x(t0)‖22dt
+
∫ t0+δ
t?
k(t)‖(Q(t− t?)−M)P (t? − t0)x(t0)‖22dt,
or equivalently ∫ t0+δ
t?
k(t) · [‖(Q(t− t?)−M)P (t? − t0)x(t0)‖22
− ‖(P (t− t0)−M)x(t0)‖22
]
dt > 0. (12)
Using (10) and the semi-group property, (12) simplifies to∫ t0+δ
t?
k(t) · x(t0)TΛ(t, t?)x(t0)dt > 0, (13)
where Λ(t, t?) = P (t?− t0)Q(2(t− t?))P (t?− t0)−P (2(t− t0)). A sufficient condition for (13)
to hold is
h(t, x(t0)) = x(t0)
TΛ(t, t?)x(t0) > 0, for t > t?. (14)
As δ ↓ 0, we can write P (t) = I + tA + O (δ2), where O (δ2) /δ ≤ L for sufficiently small δ
and some finite constant L. We therefore have
Λ(t, t∗) =
(
I + (t? − t0)A+O
(
δ2
))
(I + 2(t− t?)B
+O (δ2)) (I + (t? − t0)A+O (δ2))− (I + 2(t− t0)A
+O (δ2)) = 2(t− t?)B + 2(t? − t0)A− 2(t− t0)A
+O (δ2) = 2(t− t?)(B − A) +O (δ2) . (15)
For sufficiently small δ, the first term dominates the second term. Recall that the quadratic form
of a Laplacian matrix L exhibits the following form: xTLx =
∑n
l=1
∑l−1
k=1 Lkl(xl−xk)2, for any
x ∈ Rn. Note that B − A is in fact a negative Laplacian. Using (11), we can then write
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t− t?)
∑
r>s
(Asr −Bsr) (xr(t0)− xs(t0))2 +O
(
δ2
)
= 2(t− t?)Aij (xj(t0)− xi(t0))2 +O
(
δ2
)
. (16)
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For small enough δ, the higher order terms are dominated by the first term. Hence, if there is
a link eij such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0), there exists t? such that h(t, x(t0)) > 0 for t ∈ (t?, t0 + δ].
Since t0 was arbitrary, we conclude that the optimal strategy must satisfy ‖u?(t)‖1 = ` for all
t, given that each of the ` links connects two nodes having different values.
If no link such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0) exists at a given time t0, the adversary does not need
to break additional links, although breaking more links does not affect optimality because
h(t, x(t0)) = 0 in such a case. There are two cases under which the adversary cannot find
a link to make h(t, x(t0)) > 0: (i) The graph at time t0 is one connected component. In this
case, the nodes have already reached consensus and ‖u?(t)‖1 < `. This is a losing strategy for
the adversary as he has failed in preventing nodes from reaching agreement; (ii) The graph at
time t0 has multiple connected components, and the number of links connecting the components
is less than `. The adversary here possesses a winning strategy with ‖u?(t)‖1 < `, as he can
disconnect G into multiple components and prevent consensus.
Next, we need to show that the adversary will modify the ` links with the lowest wij values.
Let us again restrict our attention to the interval [t0, t0 + δ] where the adversary applies strategy
u. Assume (to the contrary) that the links the adversary breaks over this interval are not the
ones with the lowest wij values. In particular, assume that the adversary chooses to break link
ekl, while there is a link eij such that wij < wkl. Assume that the adversary switches at time
t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ] to strategy u? by breaking link eij and unbreaking link ekl. Then, (16) becomes
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t− t∗) (wkl(t0)− wij(t0)) +O
(
δ2
)
.
Hence, by following the same arguments as above, we can conclude that breaking ekl is not
optimal.
The second step of the proof is to show that switching to strategy u? guarantees an improved
utility for the adversary regardless of how the original trajectory corresponding to u changes
beyond time t0 + δ. To this end, we will assume that from time t0 + δ onward, strategy u?
will mimic strategy u. Assume that strategy u switches from matrix A to matrix C over the
interval [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ], and define R(t) := eCt. Hence, strategy u? will also switch from the
system matrix B to matrix C. However, the trajectories corresponding to u and u? will have
different initial conditions at time t0 + δ, due to the switch that strategy u? made at time t?.
Fig. 1 illustrates this idea. Recall that according to A, we have ‖u‖1 < ` and uij = 0. Here, the
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tt?t0 t0 +   t0 + 2 
A(u, v) = A A(u, v) = C
A(u, v) = CA(u, v) = A
A(u?, v) = B
Fig. 1. A demonstration of the technique used in the proof. The blue solid trajectory corresponds to u while the red dashed
trajectory corresponds to u?.
system matrix B can differ from the matrix A in two ways: either (i) B dictates breaking one
additional link compared to A, or (ii) B dictates breaking link eij and unbreaking link ekl where
wij < wkl. Consider Case (i) first and let us study the behavior of the system over the interval
[t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ] where we can assume that the system is time-invariant. To show that the gain
obtained over [t0, t0 + δ] by the switch made by u? is maintained over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ], we must
prove the following inequality: ∫ t0+2δ
t0+δ
k(t) · [L1 − L2] dt > 0, (17)
where
L1 := ‖(R(t− (t0 + δ))−M)Q(t0 + δ − t?)P (t? − t0)x(t0)‖22,
L2 := ‖(R(t− (t0 + δ))−M)P (t0 + δ − t0)x(t0)‖22.
As before, it suffices to prove that the integrand L1 − L2 is positive. Let us now expand both
L1 and L2.
L1 = x(t0)
TP (t? − t0)Q(t0 + δ − t?)(R(t− (t0 + δ))−M)(R(t− (t0 + δ))−M)
Q(t0 + δ − t?)P (t? − s)x(t0)
= x(t0)
T (P (t? − t0)Q(t0 + δ − t?)R(2(t− (t0 + δ)))Q(t0 + δ − t?)P (t? − t0)−M)x(t0).
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Similarly, L2 = x(t0)T (P (δ)R(2(t− (t0 + δ)))P (δ)−M)x(t0). We can then write
L1 − L2 = x(t0)T (P (t? − t0)Q(t0 + δ − t?)R(2(t− (t0 + δ)))Q(t0 + δ − t?)P (t? − t0)
−P (δ)R(2(t− (t0 + δ)))P (δ))x(t0)
:= x(t0)
T (F1 − F2)x(t0).
Before we perform a first-order Taylor expansion to the above terms, let us define the following
quantities: τ1 = t? − t0, τ2 = (t0 + δ) − t?, and τ3 = t − (t0 + δ), where t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ] and
t ∈ [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Using Proposition 1 in the Appendix, we can now expand F1 and F2 as
follows:
F1 =
(
I + τ1A+O
(
τ 21
)) (
I + τ2B +O
(
τ 22
)) (
I + 2τ3C +O
(
τ 23
)) (
I + τ2B +O
(
τ 22
))
(
I + τ1A+O
(
τ 21
))
= I + 2τ1A+ 2τ2B + 2τ3C +O
(
δ2
)
F2 =
(
I + δA+O (δ2)) (I + 2τ3C +O (τ 23 )) (I + δA+O (δ2))
= I + 2δA+ 2τ3C +O
(
δ2
)
.
Hence, we have F1 − F2 = 2 ((t0 + δ)− t?) (B − A) +O (δ2), and thereby we obtain
L1 − L2 = 2 ((t0 + δ)− t?)
∑
r>s
(Asr −Bsr) (xr(t0)− xs(t0))2 +O
(
δ2
)
= 2 (t0 + δ − t?)Aij (xj(t0)− xi(t0))2 +O
(
δ2
)
.
If instead the matrix B dictates breaking link eij and unbreaking link ekl, where wij < wkl, the
difference in the utilities would be L1−L2 = 2 (t0 + δ − t?) (wkl(t0)−wij(t0))+O (δ2). Hence,
in both cases, for small enough δ, we conclude that L1 − L2 > 0, which implies that (17) is
satisfied, and the gain obtained by switching to system matrix B at t? ∈ [t0, t0 +δ] is maintained
over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Note that the effect of switching to matrix C is cancelled out in F1 − F2,
and hence L1 − L2, since the strategy u? is mimicking strategy u. Hence, by partitioning the
interval (t0 + 2δ, T ] into small sub-intervals of length δ and repeating the above analysis, we
conclude that the gain due to the switch at time t? is preserved over the remaining time of the
problem.
We can now derive the optimal strategy of the designer in the min–max problem. Recall the
set L`(v) ⊆ E defined in (8). Let L`,k(v) ∈ E denote the k-th link of L`(v), k ∈ {1, . . . , `}.
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TABLE I
ALGORITHM I: COMPUTING THE OPTIMAL STRATEGY FOR THE MINIMIZER IN THE MIN–MAX PROBLEM.
0: input: a strategy v with ‖v‖1 = 0
1: for i = ` ↓ 1
2: if ∃S ⊆ Φ(P(0)), |S| = i, L`,i(0) /∈ L`(vS(b))
3: Set v?ij = b, ∀eij ∈ S ∪ Φ`−i
(P(vS(b))).
4: Exit for loop.
5: end
6: end
7: if ‖v‖1 = 0
8: Set v?ij = b for all eij ∈ Φ`
(P(0)).
9: end
Also, define L−1`,k(v) ∈ R as the value such that Φ(L`,k(v),L−1`,k(v)) = L`,k(v). We assume that
L−1`,1(v) ≥ . . . ≥ L−1`,` (v). Further, define the sets P(v) = {(eij, aijνij) : eij /∈ L`(v)} ⊂ E × R
and P(v) = {(eij, νij) : eij /∈ L`(v)} ⊂ E × R. We also define
[vS(b)]ij =
 b, eij ∈ S0, eij /∈ S
Theorem 2. In the min–max problem, and under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal strategy of
the designer is to run Algorithm I and set v?ij ∈ {0, b} if νij = 0. Further, it is optimal for the
designer to modify ` links.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we deduce that ‖v?(t)‖1 = b`, because the designer would be at a
disadvantage if he modifies fewer links than the adversary.
We first consider the designer’s strategy over a fixed small interval [t0, t0 +δ] over which both
u and v are fixed. Using similar steps as those leading to (13), and after applying a first-order
Taylor expansion, we can write the designer’s utility over [t0, t0 + δ] as∫ t0+δ
t0
k(t) · 2(t− t0)
∑
j>i
(aij + vij)(1− uij)(xi(t0)− xj(t0))2dt+O
(
δ2
)
. (18)
According to Theorem 1, and in the absence of the designer, it is optimal for the adversary to
break the links in L`(0). Therefore, the designer must attempt to modify the ranking of the links
such that the links (or a subset of them) in L`(0) are not in L`(v?). In essence, this is what
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Algorithm I attempts to achieve. Being of the lowest negative value, and hence the link both the
adversary and the designer are interested in, let us explore how the designer can push L`,`(0)
higher in the ranking of the link values. The designer can achieve this if under some strategy
v ∈ V , the value L−1`,` (0) is no longer among the lowest ` negative values; in other words, the
designer can alter the ranking if there is a set S ⊂ P(0), |S| = `, such that when he sets vij = b
for all links in S, there will be ` values that are smaller than L−1`,` (0) (steps 2 and 3 in Algorithm
I). The adversary will then break the links in S and will spare the link corresponding to L−1`,` (0)
as required. To see why this is optimal, consider the following two cases, covering the types of
links that can be in S.
Case 1: If a link in S is also in L`(0), then this is optimal due to the fact that the adversary will
disconnect that link since it is in L`(0). Hence, if the designer can utilize this link to modify the
ranking and protect a link whose associated value is more negative (L`,`(0) in this case), then
this can only improve his utility. The same reasoning applies if more than one of the links in S
are also in L`(0).
Case 2: If none of the links in S is in L`(0), then necessarily some of the links in L`(0) will
also be protected along with the link corresponding to L−1`,` (0). This is because |S| = `, and the
adversary can break at most ` links. Hence, this scenario is more favorable to the designer than
the previous one and can therefore only improve his utility.
If such an S exists, then the designer would have exhausted all possible moves, since |S| = `,
and the algorithm terminates (step 4 of the algorithm). Otherwise, if no such set exists in P(0),
then the designer should try to protect the next most negative link whose value is precisely
L−1`,`−1(0) by finding a set S of size ` − 1. Since L−1`,`−1(0) ≥ L−1`,` (0), the link corresponding
to L−1`,` (0) along with S will constitute the set of ` links that the adversary will break. Then,
the designer should set vij = b for all the links in S, and for the remaining action the designer
should select the link with the most negative νij that is not in L`(vS(b)); this is precisely the set
Φ1
(P(vS(b))) (step 3 of the algorithm). The reason behind searching in P(vS(b)) and not in
P(vS(b)) after finding S is that the aij’s only affect the utility of the designer when he attempts
to alter the ranking.
This procedure then repeats until the designer has tried to protect all the links in L`(0). If the
designer fails in protecting all the links in L`(0), then we must have ‖v‖1 = 0, i.e., the input
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strategy was not altered. Then, the optimal strategy is to set vij = b for the links with most
negative νij’s in P(0) (steps 7 and 8 in Algorithm I).
The final step of the proof is to show that applying Algorithm I over [0, T ] is optimal for
the designer. To this end, it suffices to show that modifying links with lower νij values is
more beneficial to the designer, as Algorithm I attempts to protect these links. Given the links
eij, ekl ∈ E , assume that νij < νkl. Consider the two system matrices A and B, and let vij = 0,
vkl = b and v?ij = b, v
?
kl = 0. Assume that a strategy v dictates applying matrix A over [t0, t0 +δ]
and applying the matrix C over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Also, assume that according to v?, the designer
applies A over [t0 + δ, t?), B over (t?, t0 + δ], and C over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Following the
steps presented in step 2 of the proof of Theorem 1, we conclude that, for δ small enough, the
quantity −2 (t0 + δ − t?) b(νkl − νij) +O (δ2) is negative. It then follows that the gain obtained
by switching to system matrix B at t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ] is maintained over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Hence,
by partitioning the interval (t0 + 2δ, T ] into small sub-intervals of length δ and repeating the
above analysis, we conclude that Algorithm I is optimal over [0, T ].
B. The Max–Min Problem
The following theorem specifies the optimal strategies of the adversary and the designer in
the max–min problem. Let F`(u) = Φ`({(eij, νij) : eij ∈ E(u)}) ⊂ E(u), where we recall
that E(u) = E \ {eij ∈ E : uij(t) = 1}, for some u ∈ U . If m < 2`, the sets E(u),F`(u)
could contain fewer than ` links. For simplicity, we assume that m ≥ ` in the following proof,
which guarantees that |F`(u)| = `. However, the result of the theorem applies regardless of this
assumption, and the modification of the proof is straightforward.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, and for a fixed strategy u of the adversary, the optimal
strategy of the network designer in the max–min problem is given by
v?ij(u) =
 b, eij ∈ F`(u)0, eij /∈ F`(u)
If the designer has an optimal strategy of modifying fewer than ` links, then either G has a
cut of size less than ` or the nodes have reached consensus by time t. In either of these cases,
breaking ` links is also optimal.
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Proof: The proof follows the same two steps used to prove Theorem 1. For a fixed strategy
of the adversary u, we will show that it is optimal for the minimizer to rank the links based
on their νij values. Under Assumption 1, the function x becomes piecewise continuous. Hence,
the function νij , for all eij ∈ E(u), is also piecewise continuous and its value cannot change
abruptly over a finite interval. As a result, we can regard the system as a time-invariant one over
a small interval [t0, t0 + δ] ⊂ [0, T ], where 0 < δ ≤ τ , and τ was defined in (3).
Let v be an arbitrary strategy of the designer with ‖v‖1 < b`. Over a small interval, v and
v? induce certain system matrices. Let the system matrix corresponding to v over [t0, t0 + δ] be
A(u, v) = A. Because the control strategies of both players are time-invariant over this interval,
the state trajectory is given by (9). We want to show that switching from strategy v to strategy
v? at some time t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ] can improve the utility of the designer. To this end, we assume
that the matrix induced by v? over [t0, t?) is A, while the system matrix corresponding to v?
over [t?, t0 + δ] is B. Assume that eij ∈ E(u), i.e., uij = 0. Over [t?, t0 + δ], the strategies v
and v? are identical except at link eij , where vij = 0 and v?ij = b, i.e., ‖v‖1 < ‖v?‖1 over this
sub-interval. It follows that:
Bij = aij + b > Aij = aij, Akl = Bkl, ∀ekl 6= eij. (19)
Following similar steps to those in the proof of Theorem 1, we conclude that it suffices to prove
h(t, x(t0)) = x(t0)
TΛ(t, t?)x(t0) < 0, for t > t?,
where Λ(t, t?) was defined in the proof of Theorem 1. For sufficiently small δ, we can arrive at
the expansion in (15). Using (19) and properties of Laplacian matrices, we can then write
h(t, x(t0)) = 2(t− t?)
∑
r>s
(Asr −Bsr) (xr(t0)− xs(t0))2 +O
(
δ2
)
= −2(t− t?)b (xj(t0)− xi(t0))2 +O
(
δ2
)
. (20)
For small enough δ, the higher order terms are dominated by the first term. Hence, if there is
a link eij such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0), there exists t? such that h(t, x(t0)) < 0 for t ∈ (t?, t0 + δ].
Since t0 was arbitrary, we conclude that the optimal strategy must satisfy ‖v?(t)‖1 = b` for all
t, given that each of the ` links connects two nodes having different values.
If no link such that xi(t0) 6= xj(t0) exists at a given time t0, the designer does not need to break
additional links, although breaking more links does not affect optimality because h(t, x(t0)) = 0
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in such a case. There are two cases where the designer cannot find a link to make h(t, x(t0)) < 0,
and they were presented in the proof of Theorem 1 in the case of the adversary. However, unlike
the case of the adversary, Case (i) presents a winning strategy for the designer as the nodes are
in agreement. Case (ii) is not necessarily a winning or a losing strategy for the designer.
Next, we need to show that the designer will modify the ` links in E(u) with the lowest νij
values. Let us again restrict our attention to the interval [t0, t0 + δ] where the designer applies
strategy v. Assume (to the contrary) that the links the designer modifies over this interval are
not the ones with the lowest νij values. In particular, assume that the designer chooses to modify
link ekl ∈ E(u), while there is a link eij ∈ E(u) such that νij < νkl. Assume that the designer
switches at time t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ] to strategy v? by modifying link eij instead of link ekl. Then,
(20) becomes
h(t, x(t0)) = −2(t− t∗)b (νkl(t0)− νij(t0)) +O
(
δ2
)
.
Hence, by following the same arguments as above, we can conclude that modifying ekl is not
optimal.
The second step of the proof is to show that switching to strategy v? guarantees an improved
utility for the designer regardless of how the original trajectory corresponding to v changes
beyond time t0 + δ. To this end, we will assume that from time t0 + δ onward, strategy v? will
mimic strategy v. Assume that strategy v switches from matrix A to matrix C over the interval
[t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Hence, strategy v? will also switch from the system matrix B to matrix C.
However, the trajectories corresponding to v and v? will have different initial conditions at time
t0 + δ, due to the switch that strategy v? made at time t?. Recall that according to A, we have
‖v‖1 < b` and vij = 0. Here, the system matrix B can differ from the matrix A in two ways:
either (i) B dictates modifying one additional link compared to A, or (ii) B dictates modifying
link eij instead of link ekl where νij < νkl. Consider the behavior of the system over the interval
[t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ] where we can assume that the system is time-invariant. To show that the gain
obtained over [t0, t0 + δ] by the switch made by v? is maintained over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ], it suffices
to prove that the integrant L1 − L2 is negative, where L1 and L2 were defined in the proof of
Theorem 1. For Case (i), by following the steps presented in the proof of Theorem 1, we can
write
L1 − L2 = −2 (t0 + δ − t?) b (xj(t0)− xi(t0))2 +O
(
δ2
)
.
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For Case (ii), the difference in utilities would be
L1 − L2 = 2 (t0 + δ − t?) (wkl(t0)− wij(t0)) +O
(
δ2
)
.
Hence, for small enough δ, we conclude that L1−L2 < 0. By partitioning the interval (t0+2δ, T ]
into small sub-intervals of length δ and repeating the above analysis, we conclude that the gain
due to the switch at time t? is preserved over the remaining time of the problem. This concludes
the proof.
Next, we present the optimal strategy of the adversary. To this end, define the set
D` = Φ`({(eij,aijνij) : eij ∈ E} ∪ {(eij, (aij + b)νij) : eij ∈ E}).
Theorem 4. In the max–min problem, and under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal strategy of
the adversary is given by
u?ij(t) =
 1, eij ∈ D`0, eij /∈ D`
Further, it is optimal for the adversary to break ` links.
Proof: By Theorem 3, we deduce that ‖u?(t)‖1 = `, because the adversary would be at a
disadvantage if he breaks fewer links than the designer. We first consider the adversary’s strategy
over a fixed small interval [t0, t0 + δ] over which both u and v are fixed. Using a first-order
Taylor expansion, the adversary’s utility over [t0, t0 + δ] is given by (18).
In this problem, the adversary has the first-mover-advantage and needs to dispose of the links
that can reduce his utility. The adversary knows that, according to v?(u), the designer attempts
to make the νij’s smaller by adding b to the corresponding edge weights. However, we cannot
rule out the possibility that (alk + b)νlk > aijνij , for some links ekl and eij . Hence, the adversary
is not only interested in finding the smallest negative (aij + b)νij’s, but also needs to consider
the aijνij’s themselves. It follows that the adversary needs to find the terms that can become
very small (negative) and set uij = 1 to the corresponding links. But those links are exactly the
ones included in D`. Formally, we can write
−
∑
j>i
eij∈D`
(aij + vij)νij ≤ −
∑
j>i
eij /∈D`
(aij + vij)νij,
This confirms that, over the interval [t0, t0 + δ], u? is as claimed.
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The final step of the proof is to show that switching from a strategy u to strategy u? guarantees
an improved utility for the designer over [0, T ]. To this end, it suffices to show that modifying
links with lower wij values is more beneficial to the adversary. For the links eij, ekl ∈ E , assume
that wij < wkl. Consider the two system matrices A and B, and let uij = 0, ukl = 1 and u?ij = 1,
u?kl = 0. Assume that the strategy u dictates applying matrix A over [t0, t0 + δ] and applying
the matrix C over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. On the other hand, we assume that according to u?, the
adversary applies A over [t0 + δ, t?), B over (t?, t0 + δ], and C over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Following
the steps presented in step 2 of the proof of Theorem 1, we conclude that, for δ small enough,
the quantity 2 (t0 + δ − t?) (wkl−wij) +O (δ2) is positive, which implies that the gain obtained
by switching to system matrix B at t? ∈ [t0, t0 + δ] is maintained over [t0 + δ, t0 + 2δ]. Hence,
by partitioning the interval (t0 + 2δ, T ] into small sub-intervals of length δ and repeating the
above analysis, we conclude that u? is optimal over [0, T ].
Remark 3. (Potential-Theoretic Analogy) When the graph is viewed as an electrical network,
aij +vij can be viewed as the conductance of link eij ∈ E , and xi−xj as the potential difference
across the link. Therefore, according to Theorems 2 and 3, the optimal strategy of the designer in
both problems involves finding the links with the highest potential difference (or the lowest νij’s)
and increasing the conductance of those links by setting vij = b. This leads to increasing the
power dissipation across those links, which translates to increasing the information flow across
the network and results in faster convergence. The optimal strategy of the adversary should
therefore involve breaking the links with the highest power dissipation. But power dissipation
is given by (aij + vij)(xi − xj)2, and this is exactly what the adversary targets according to
Theorems 1 and 4.
C. From Potential Theory to the Maximum Principle
In this section, we show that the strategies derived in the above theorems satisfy the first-order
necessary conditions for optimality given by the maximum principle (MP). We will address here
the min–max problem; a theorem similar to the one presented below can be obtained also for
the max–min problem. In [1], we showed that the optimal strategies provided by the MP for the
min–max problem are the same as those derived in Theorems 1 and 2, with the ranking of the
links performed after replacing the quantity νij with the quantity (pj − pi)(xi − xj), where p is
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the costate vector. The next theorem states that the potential-theoretic strategies satisfy the MP
if the controllers do note switch infinitely many times over [0, T ].
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal strategies in Theorems 1 and 2 satisfy the
canonical equations of the MP.
Proof: See the Appendix.
D. Complexity of the Optimal Strategies
We next study the complexity of the optimal strategies. We first start with the max–min
problem. Assuming, as in Remark 2, that the players switch their strategies a total of K times
over [0, T ], we conclude that the worst-case complexity of the strategy of either player is O(K ·
m logm) as their strategies involve merely the ranking of sets of size at most 2m. As for the min–
max problem, the complexity of the adversary’s strategy is O(K ·m logm). The main bottleneck
in the strategy of the designer is step 2 in Algorithm I. The size of the set P(0) is at most m−`;
thus, the worst-case complexity for the designer is K ·∑m−`i=1 (m−`i ) ≈ K ·∑`i=1(m − `)i. By
comparison with (6), we conclude that the optimal strategies achieve vast complexity reductions.
E. An Illustrative Example
The goal of this example is twofold: (i) to show how the players execute their strategies;
and (ii) to serve as a counter example showing that an SPE may not exist and to provide some
guidelines as to when one would exist. We will study the interaction between the designer and
the adversary for the case when T = τ , and τ is very small. By Assumption 1, we conclude that
the players cannot change the actions they choose at time t = 0. Assume that G is a complete
graph with three nodes with the following weights:
A(0, 0) =

−4 3 1
3 −5 2
1 2 −3
 .
Define e1 = (1, 2), e2 = (2, 3), e3 = (1, 3). Let ν12 = −1, ν23 = −2, and ν13 = −5. Let
x(0) = [1, 2, 3]T and ` = 1. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1: (b = 1) Let us first consider the max–min problem. We haveD1 = Φ1({(e1,−3), (e1,−4),
(e2,−4), (e3,−5), (e2,−6), (e3,−10)}) = {e3}. Hence, according to Theorem 4, the adversary
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breaks e3, and we have that E(u?) = E \ e3. We also have F1(u?) = {e2}, which means that
v? = [0, 1, 0]T and u? = [0, 0, 1]T . Hence, using (18), we can write
V =
∫ T
0
k(t) · 2t[3(x1(0)− x2(0))2 + 3(x2(0)− x3(0))2]dt+O
(
δ2
)
=
∫ T
0
k(t) · 12tdt+O (δ2) .
For the min–max problem, Algorithm I uses the following sets L1(0) = {e3} and P(0) =
{(e1,−3), (e2,−4)}. Let S = {e2}, and note that S ∈ Φ(P(0)) = {e1, e2}. We then have
vS(1) = [0, 1, 0]
T and L1(vS(1)) = {e2}. Note that L1(0) /∈ L1(vS(1)). Hence, the condition
in step 2 of the algorithm is satisfied with this choice of S, and we have v? = vS(1). Then,
Theorem 2 says that the designer will increase the weight of e2, and Theorem 1 says that the
adversary will break the same link, i.e., v? = [0, 1, 0]T and u? = [0, 1, 0]T . We thus have
V =
∫ T
0
k(t) · 14tdt+O (δ2) .
We conclude that in this case V > V , and an SPE does not exist.
Case 2: (b = 0.4) By repeating the above steps, we conclude that in the max–min problem we
have v? = [0, 0.4, 0]T and u? = [0, 0, 1]T , and we can write
V =
∫ T
0
k(t) · 10.8tdt+O (δ2) .
For the min–max problem, one cannot find a set S satisfying the conditions of step 2 in
Algorithm I. To execute step 8 of the algorithm, note that L1(0) = {e3}, and hence Φ1(P(0)) =
{e2}. We therefore have v? = [0, 0.4, 0]T and u? = [0, 0, 1]T , and hence
V =
∫ T
0
k(t) · 10.8tdt+O (δ2) .
In this case, the pair of inequalities (4) are satisfied and an SPE exists. The main difference
between the two cases was that the designer was able to find a set S that allows him to alter the
ranking and deceive the adversary when b = 1. This made the adversary break e3 in the max–min
problem and break e2 in the min–max problem which led to having V 6= V . When such a set
does not exit, the strategy of the adversary is unchanged in both problems, and hence the upper
and lower values would agree. Hence, for an SPE to exist, one needs a behavior similar to Case
2 to occur throughout the problem horizon [0, T ]. This of course depends on the value of b and
the weights aij . Section IV explores the question of existence of an SPE further.
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IV. A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE EXISTENCE OF AN SPE
Thus far, we have solved the min–max and max–min problems separately and showed that
the derived optimal strategies achieve the upper and lower values. Hence, to prove the existence
of an SPE, it remains to verify whether the pair of inequalities (4) can be satisfied under some
assumptions, even though the action sets of the players are non-rectangular in the max–min
problem. Besides the issue of non-rectangular action sets, the main reason that the upper and
lower values are different is mainly due to the ability of the minimizer to deceive the maximizer
by altering the ranking of the most negative values. If we remove this ability from the network
designer, we should expect that an SPE would exist. The following theorem makes this argument
formal. Define γ := 4‖x0‖
2∞
2
,  > 0. We assume that  is chosen to guarantee γ > 1.
Theorem 6. Given  > 0, assume that T is small enough such that (32) in the Appendix holds.
Then, under Assumptions 1 and 2, a sufficient condition for the existence of an SPE for the
underlying zero-sum game between the designer and the adversary is to select b such that
0 ≤ b ≤ min
eij ,ekl∈E
|γaij − akl| , (21)
given that aij 6= akl and aij > γakl whenever aij > akl, for all eij, ekl ∈ E .
Proof: It suffices to show that L`(v?) = L`(0) = D` as this would imply that the adversary
would break the same links whether he acts first or second, and as a result the strategy of the
minimizer in both problems will be the same. This will guarantee that (4) is satisfied. This would
occur if the minimizer cannot protect any of the links in L`(0). In other words, this will happen
if the minimizer cannot satisfy the condition in step 2 of Algorithm I for any i ∈ {1, . . . , `}. A
sufficient condition for L`(v?) = L`(0) = D` to hold is to require
min
eij∈Φ(P(0))
(aij + b)νij > max
eij∈L`(0)
aijνij.
This implies that no matter how the designer changes the weights of the links in Φ(P(0)), he
cannot make those links more negative than the links in L`(0). To satisfy this inequality, we will
establish that whenever aijνij > aklνkl, we must have (aij + b)νij > aklνkl, for all eij, ekl ∈ E .
We can then re-write the condition on b as
b ≤ aijνij − aklνkl−νij = akl
|νkl|
|νij| − aij, ∀eij, ekl ∈ E (22)
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Consider the following two cases. If νkl ≥ νij , then we must have akl > aij . Then, by assumption
we have that akl > γaij . By Lemma 1 in the Appendix, we can write
akl
|νkl|
|νij| − aij ≥
1
γ
akl − aij > 0. (23)
Next, consider the case when νij > νkl. In this case, aij can be larger or smaller than akl.
However, if aij > akl, and recalling that aijνij > aklνkl, then
γakl < aij < akl
|νkl|
|νij| ≤ γakl,
which is a contradiction. The case akl = aij is excluded by assumption. Hence, in this case, we
must have aij < akl, and the inequality in (23) applies. Thus, by choosing b as in (21), we obtain
the condition we are seeking. Note that we do not need to consider the case when aijνij = aklνkl
since the players will be indifferent as to which link to choose.
Remark 4. The condition derived in the above theorem requires the network to be “sufficiently
diverse" in the sense that the weights of the links have to be not only different from each other,
but also a factor γ apart. This is due to the fact that we were seeking uniform bounds on the
νij’s, for all eij ∈ E . If we allow b to vary with time, then one can find less restrictive conditions
to ensure the existence of an SPE. However, this would require (22) to be verified at each time
instant. Further, the bound derived in (23) is loose, because it was obtained by bounding |vkl|
and |vij| independently, for eij, ekl ∈ E . Tighter bounds could be given by studying the dynamics
of |νkl|/|νij|. However, studying the time derivative of this ratio is not tractable.
Remark 5. This result highlights the fact that, in general, Stackelberg games are more natural
to study security problems than zero-sum games. In fact, the leader-follower formulation fits
many real-world security scenarios; see [21] and the references therein. However, the sufficient
condition we derive here is a step in the right direction for establishing the existence of an SPE
for the zero-sum game between the designer and the adversary. We are currently investigating
whether this condition is also necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the impact of an adversarial attack on a network of agents
performing consensus averaging. The adversary’s objective is to slow down the convergence of
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the computation at the nodes to the global average. We introduced a network designer whose
objective is to assist the nodes reach consensus by countering the attack of the adversary. The
adversary and the network designer are capable of targeting links. We have formulated and solved
two problems that capture the competition between the two players. We considered practical
models for the players by constraining their actions along the problem horizon. The derived
strategies were shown to exhibit a low worst-case complexity. When Zeno behavior is excluded,
we showed that the optimal strategies admit a potential-theoretic analogy. Finally, we showed
that when the link weights are sufficiently diverse, an SPE exists for the zero-sum game between
the designer and the adversary.
Future work will focus on removing Assumption 1 and showing that Zeno behavior can be
ruled out in optimality. Formulating the problems in discrete-time is also of interest. Another
interesting line of research is to derive the optimal strategies when the knowledge of the players
about the state and the topology of the network is restricted. When applying necessary conditions
for optimality, e.g., the MP, to the min–max or the max–min problem, one must first prove the
existence of optimal controllers. Such results can be viewed as existence results for equilibria
in the general framework of Stackelberg games. This is another avenue for future research.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 5
For a fixed strategy v of the designer, it was shown in [1] that the adversary’s strategy derived
using the MP requires finding the lowest fij = (aij+vij)(pi−pj)(xj−xi) values, for all eij ∈ E .
However, Theorem 1 requires finding the lowest wij’s. The designer’s strategy relies on finding
the lowest (pi − pj)(xj − xi) values according to the MP, and it requires finding the lowest
νij’s according to Theorem 2. In order to prove the theorem, and since wij = (aij + vij)νij ,
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aij + vij ≥ 0, it is sufficient to show that wij ≤ wkl implies that fij ≤ fkl, for all eij , ekl ∈ E .
Without loss of generality, we will assume that vij = vkl = 0. The Hamiltonian associated with
the min–max problem is:
H(x, p, u, v) =
1
2
k(t)‖x(t)− x¯‖22 + p(t)TA(u(t), v(t))x(t),
where p is the costate vector, whose existence is guaranteed by the MP because an optimal
solution for the min–max exists. The first-order necessary conditions for optimality are (noting
that AT = A and recalling that V = V (0)) [22]:
p˙ = − ∂
∂x
H
= −k(x− x¯)− Ap, p(T ) = 0 (24)
x˙ = Ax, x(0) = x0 (25)
u?(v) = arg max
U
H(x, p, u, v), v? = arg max
V
H(x, p, u?(v), v).
To prove the theorem, we will rely on approximating the state and costate up to first-order using
Taylor expansion. To this end, we partition the problem’s horizon into L > K small sub-intervals
of length 0 < δ ≤ τ , where τ was defined in (3), over which the system is time-invariant. More
formally, define the times 0 = t1 < t2 < . . . < tL < tL+1 = T . Let Ai be the system matrix
corresponding to the interval [ti, ti+1], i = 1, . . . , L. We will denote the i-th row of matrix Ak by
Ak,i and its (i, j)-th element by akij . The proof comprises two steps: (i) we establish the claim of
the theorem over [tL, tL+1]; and (ii) we generalize the argument to hold over [0, T ]. We start by
considering the interval [tL, tL+1]. The solutions to ODEs (24) and (25) over this interval are:
xAL(t) = e
AL(t−tL)xAL(tL) (26)
pAL(t) =
∫ T
t
e−AL(t−τ)(xAL(τ)− x¯)dτ. (27)
Let Pi(t) := eAit = I + tAi +O (δ2). We can then re-write the above expressions as
xAL(t) = PL(t− tL)xAL(tL)
= (I + (t− tL)A)xAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
pAL(t) =
∫ T
t
PL(τ − t)[PL(τ − tL)−M ]xAL(tL)dτ
= (T − t)(I −M)xAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
,
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where the last equality follows because (T − t)(T − tL)AL = O (δ2). Define ξ(α, β) := α− β,
α, β ∈ R, and write
xAL(t) = (I + ξ(t, tL)AL)xAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
(28)
pAL(t) = ξ(T, t)(I −M)xAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
. (29)
Further, define the matrices G := I + ξ(t, tL)AL, R := ξ(T, t)(I −M), and write
wij = a
L
ij(xAL,i − xAL,j)(xAL,j − xAL,i)
= aLijxAL(tL)
T (Gi −Gj)(Gj −Gi)TxAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
fij = a
L
ijxAL(tL)
T (Ri −Rj)(Gj −Gi)TxAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
,
where RTi , R
T
i are the i-th row of G and R, respectively. Using the above definitions, we obtain
(Gi −Gj)(Gj −Gi)T = −(Ii − Ij)(Ii − Ij)T − ξ(t, tL)((Ii − Ij)(AL,i − AL,j)T
+(AL,i − AL,j)(Ii − Ij)T )− ξ(t, tL)2(AL,i − AL,j)(AL,i − AL,j)T .
The last term is quadratic, and thus we can absorb it in O (δ2). We then have
aLij(Gi −Gj)(Gj −Gi)T − aLkl(Gk −Gl)(Gl −Gk)T = aLkl(Ik − Il)(Ik − Il)T
−aLij(Ii − Ij)(Ii − Ij)T + (aLkl(Ik − Il)(AL,k − AL,l)T − aLij(Ii − Ij)(AL,i − AL,j)T )ξ(t, tL)
+(aLkl(AL,k − AL,l)(Ik − Il)T − aLij(AL,i − AL,j)(Ii − Ij)T )ξ(t, tL) +O
(
δ2
)
.
Similarly, we have
aLij(Ri −Rj)(Gj −Gi)T − aLkl(Rk −Rl)(Gl −Gk)T = (aLkl(Ik − Il)(Ik − Il)T
−aLij(Ii − Ij)(Ii − Ij)T )ξ(T, t) +O
(
δ2
)
.
Let Γ1 = aLkl(Ik − Il)(Ik − Il)T − aLij(Ii − Ij)(Ii − Ij)T and Γ2 = aLkl(Ik − Il)(AL,k − AL,l)T −
aLij(Ii − Ij)(AL,i − AL,j)T . We now have
wij − wkl = xAL(tL)T (Γ1 + ξ(t, tL)Γ2 + ξ(t, tL)ΓT2 )xAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
,
fij − fkl = ξ(T, t)xAL(tL)TΓ1xAL(tL) +O
(
δ2
)
.
If wij − wkl ≤ 0, since ξ(T, t) ≥ 0, we can write
ξ(T, t)(wij−wkl) = xAL(tL)T (ξ(T, t)Γ1+ξ(T, t)ξ(t, tL)Γ2+ξ(T, t)ξ(t, tL)ΓT2 )xAL(tL)+O
(
δ2
) ≤ 0,
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or ξ(T, t)xAL(tL)
TΓ1xAL(tL) + O (δ2) ≤ 0, but the left hand side is fij − fkl; hence, wij ≤
wkl =⇒ fij ≤ fkl as required. So far, we have verified the claim of the theorem over the
interval [tL, T ] only. We are now in a position to generalize the statement of the theorem to the
interval [0, T ]. The only complication that arises when studying this interval is that the terminal
condition, i.e. pL−1(tL), is not forced to be zero as in [tL, T ]. Over the interval [tL−1, tL], the
state and costate are
xL−1(t) = eAL−1(t−tL−1)xAL−1(tL−1)
pAL−1(t) = e
−AL−1(t−tL−1)pAL−1(tL−1)−
∫ t
tL−1
e−AL−1(t−τ)(xAL−1(τ)− x¯)dτ.
Solving for pAL−1(tL−1) in terms of pAL−1(tL) and substituting back, we can write pAL−1(t) in
terms of pAL−1(tL) as follows:
pAL−1(t) = e
−AL−1(t−tL)pAL−1(tL) +
∫ tL
t
e−AL−1(t−τ)(xAL−1(τ)− x¯)dτ. (30)
By continuity of the state and costate functions, it follows that xAL−1(tL) = xAL(tL), pAL−1(tL) =
pAL(tL). Using a first-order Taylor expansion and (29), we can write
pAL−1(t) = (I + ξ(tL, t)AL−1)pAL(tL) + ξ(tL, t)(I −M)xAL−1(tL−1) +O
(
δ2
)
= ξ(tL, t)(I −M)xAL−1(tL) + ξ(tL, t)(I −M)xAL−1(tL−1) +O
(
δ2
)
.
We can further simplify this expression using xAL−1(t) as follows:
ξ(tL, t)(I −M)xAL−1(tL) = ξ(tL, t)(I −M)eAL−1(tL−tL−1)xAL−1(tL−1)
= ξ(tL, t)(I −M)xAL−1(tL−1) +O
(
δ2
)
,
and therefore we have
pAL−1(t) = 2ξ(tL, t)(I −M)xAL−1(tL−1) +O
(
δ2
)
. (31)
Comparing (29) and (31), we conclude that the argument used to prove the claim over the interval
[tL, T ] applies over [tL−1, tL]. Hence, wij − wkl ≤ 0 implies that fij − fkl ≤ 0 over [tL−1, tL].
Note that we can generalize (30) to any interval [ti, ti+1], i = 1, . . . , L, as follows:
pAi(t) = e
−Ai(t−ti+1)pAi(ti+1) +
∫ ti+1
t
e−Ai(t−τ)(xAi(τ)− x¯)dτ.
Following similar steps to the above, we can arrive at
pAi(t) =
T − ti
δ
ξ(ti+1, t)(I −M)xAi(ti) +O
(
δ2
)
, t ∈ [ti, ti+1],
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which maintains the same structure as in (31), and the claim therefore holds for the interval
[ti, ti+1], i = 1, . . . , L, and the theorem is proved.
B. Technical Results
Proposition 1. Given τ1, τ2, τ3, which were defined in terms of δ > 0 in Theorem 1, let f be a
real-valued function. Then, if f(δ) = O (τ 2i ) as δ → 0, we have f(δ) = O (δ2) , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Also, if f(δ) = τiO
(
τ 2j
)
as δ → 0, then f(δ) = O (δ3) , i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Proof: Recall that we write f(x) = O (g(x)), for some real-valued function g, as x→ a if
there exist constants M,γ such that |f(x)| ≤ M |g(x)|, for all x satisfying |x − a| < γ. Since
f(δ) = O (τ 2i ) as δ → 0, and recalling that by definition we have τi ≤ δ for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we
can write f(δ) ≤ Mτ 2i ≤ Mδ2. Hence, f(δ) = O (δ2). To prove the second statement, recall
that h(x)O (g(x)) = O (h(x)g(x)), for any two real-valued functions h, g. Hence, as δ → 0, we
have f(δ) = τiO
(
τ 2j
)
= O (τiτ 2j ). Therefore, f(δ) ≤Mτiτ 2j ≤Mδ3 and f(δ) = O (δ3).
Lemma 1. Given  > 0 and δ ≤ τ , τ defined in (3), one can select the problem horizon T small
enough such that
 ≤ |xi(t)− xj(t)| ≤ 2‖x0‖∞, ∀eij ∈ E , (32)
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof: By the structure of the system matrix in (1), we can deduce that |xi − xj| cannot
increase as t→ T . Thus
|xi(t)− xj(t)| ≤ max
1≤i,j≤n
|xi(0)− xj(0)|
≤ 2 max
1≤i≤n
|xi(0)| = 2‖x0‖∞.
This provides the uniform upper bound. In order to obtain a uniform lower bound, we need to
ensure that |xi(t)− xj(t)| does not approach zero as t→ T . We are seeking a time t? such that
for a given  > 0, we have |xi(t) − xj(t)| ≥  for all t < t? and all eij ∈ E . We can then fix
T < t? to ensure the existence of a uniform lower bound on |xi(t)−xj(t)|. Let us again restrict
our attention to a small interval [t0, t0 + δ] where the system is time-invariant, and let the system
matrix over this interval be A. We require that the system did not reach equilibrium over this
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interval, i.e., x(t0 + δ) 6= x¯. Without loss of generality, we assume that x1(t0) > . . . > xn(t0)2.
Define the following dynamics
d
dt
(yi − x1(t0)) =
∑
j 6=i
Aij(x1(t0)− yi),
d
dt
(y
i
− xn(t0)) =
∑
j 6=i
Aij(xn(t0)− yi),
with initial conditions yi(t0) = 2x1(t0), yi(t0) = 2xn(t0). Note that x˙i =
∑
j 6=iAij(xj − xi). It
follows that y˙
i
≤ x˙i ≤ y˙i. By the comparison principle, we conclude that yi − xn(t0) ≤ xi ≤
yi − x1(t0), for i ∈ N . Note that we can readily find the solution trajectories for y and y. By
defining ai =
∑
j 6=iAij , we can then write
yi − x1(t0) = e−ai(t−t0)x1(t0), yi − xn(t0) = e−ai(t−t0)xn(t0).
By solving the equation yi−i − x1(t0) = yi − xn(t0), we can find a time t?i when xi−1 can
potentially meet xi:
t?i =
1
ai−1 − ai ln
(
x1(t0)
xn(t0)
)
+ t0.
If t?i > t0 + δ, for all i ∈ N , then we need to propagate the solution forward, and keeping in
mind that the system matrix could change, until we find a time t?i in some interval [t˜, t˜ + δ]
where yi−i = yi for some i ∈ N . Then, for a given  > 0, we can select T < t?i such that
|xi − xi−1| ≥ |yi − yi−1| ≥ ; hence, we conclude that for this choice of T we can guarantee
that |xi − xj| ≥  > 0 for all eij ∈ E .
2We are making the implicit assumption that x1(0) > . . . > xn(0).
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